Screening of possibly incompetent agents
Year of publication: |
October 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Baranchuk, Nina ; Dybvig, Philip H. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 135.2015, p. 15-18
|
Subject: | Screening | Disagreement | Prior beliefs | Agency | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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