Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Jullien, Bruno ; Salanié, Bernard ; Salanié, François |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 30.2007, 1, p. 151-169
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Risk aversion | Adverse selection | Moral hazard | Screening |
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