Screening vs. signaling in technology licensing

A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior on this fact

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Antelo, Manel
Institutions:	Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Government of Andalusia
Subject:	Licensing \| asymmetric information \| screening \| signaling

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number E2010/05 31 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008469948