Screening When Some Agents are Non-Strategic: Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude? (Technical Supplement)
Year of publication: |
2005-12-26
|
---|---|
Authors: | Deneckere, Raymond ; Severinov, Sergei |
Institutions: | Vancouver School of Economics |
Subject: | mechanism design | screening | honesty | bounded rationality |
-
De Clippel, Geoffroy, (2016)
-
Mechanism design with bounded depth of reasoning and small modeling mistakes
De Clippel, Geoffroy, (2014)
-
De Clippel, Geoffroy, (2016)
- More ...
-
Additional Proofs for Mechanism Design with Communication Costs.
Deneckere, Raymond, (2005)
-
Peters, Michael, (2003)
-
Peters, Michael, (2005)
- More ...