Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs
Year of publication: |
2013-03
|
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Authors: | Pavoni, Nicola ; Setty, Ofer ; Violante, Giovanni L |
Institutions: | C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers |
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Recursive Contracts | Search | Welfare Program | Work |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 9389 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings |
Source: |
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Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs
Pavoni, Nicola, (2006)
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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse
van der Linden, Bruno, (2004)
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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse
Lehmann, Etienne, (2004)
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Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs
Pavoni, Nicola, (2006)
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A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments
Kaplan, Greg, (2011)
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Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists
Krueger, Dirk, (2009)
- More ...