Secession-proof cost allocations and Stable Group structures in models of horizontal differentiation
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Le Breton, Michel ; Weber, Shlomo |
Published in: |
Group formation in economics : networks, clubs, and coalitions. - Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN 0-521-84271-9. - 2005, p. 266-285
|
Subject: | Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie | Rawls's theory of justice | Produktdifferenzierung | Product differentiation | Gebietskörperschaft | Territorial authority | USA | United States | Theorie | Theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
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