Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Anno, Hidekazu ; Kurino, Morimitsu |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |
Subject: | strategy-proofness | second-best incentive compatibility | top trading cycles rules | deferred acceptance rules |
Series: | WZB Discussion Paper ; SP II 2014-201 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 77978507X [GVK] hdl:10419/93379 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2014201 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
Source: |
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