Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation
As Iran continues its apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons breakout capability and North Korea resists efforts to roll back its proliferation, policy makers in Washington eager to prevent further proliferation in both regions regard security guarantees to allies as crucial tools. But recent scholarship calls into question whether security guarantees ameliorate proliferation risks. Relying on a combination of large-N quantitative analysis and a case study of South Korea from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, this article argues that, consistent with policy makers’ conventional wisdom, security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bleek, Philipp C. ; Lorber, Eric B. |
Published in: |
Journal of Conflict Resolution. - Peace Science Society (International). - Vol. 58.2014, 3, p. 429-454
|
Publisher: |
Peace Science Society (International) |
Subject: | nuclear proliferation | alliances | security guarantees | extended deterrence | South Korea |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
Proliferation, preemption, and intervention in the nuclearization of second-tier states
Dittmeier, Christopher R., (2013)
-
Chapter 2 Defense economics and international security
McGuire, Martin C., (1995)
-
Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments
Fuhrmann, Matthew, (2014)
- More ...