Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives

In this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.

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Year of publication:	2003-10
Authors:	Barro, Jason ; Beaulieu, Nancy
Institutions:	National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	NBER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	HE Number 10017
Classification:	I1 - Health ; J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710518