Selection Between Pareto-optimal Outcomes in Two-Person Bargaining With and Without the right to Make a Proposal
The selection between Pareto-optimal outcomes in two-person bargaining with the right to make a proposal and without this right are considered. Concepts for the selection without the right to make a proposal are the Nash criterion, the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion, the egalitarian solution, the equal-loss solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion modified by prominence aspects. A model for the selection if one player can make an ultimatum proposal is the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criterion with adapted Bliss point. Experiments using the strategy method were performed to test the predictions of the different models. The results support the modified Kalai-Smorodinsky criteria for the corresponding situations.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Vogt, Bodo ; Albers, Wulf |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 18.2001, p. 77-90
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
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