Selection of Public Servants into Politics

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians  that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include  incompatibility and  ineligibility rules  due  to  concerns about conflicts  of interest  and the politicization of the public  service.   We study  how these rules affect  the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates  for public  servants and  thus  the selection into  politics. We compile  a  novel  dataset that  captures the  fraction  of public servants in 71 national  legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there  are  7 percentage points  fewer public  servants in parliaments where  a strict regime  is in force.   Supplementary evidence  shows  that  the  fraction  of public  servants  in parliament is positively correlated with government  consumption  as well as the absence  of corruption.