Self-Confirming Equilibrium.
In a self-confining equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and each player's beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. Thus, if a self-confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly, no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs, even though beliefs about play at off-path information sets need not be correct. The authors characterize the ways in which self-confirming equilibria and Nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self-confirming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Fudenberg, Drew ; Levine, David K |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 61.1993, 3, p. 523-45
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
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