Self-correcting mechanisms in public procurement : why award and contract should be seperated
by Dieter Bös and Martin Kolmar
| Year of publication: |
2000
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Bös, Dieter ; Kolmar, Martin |
| Publisher: |
Bonn : Graduate School of Economics |
| Subject: | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Produktqualität | Product quality | Signalling | Rent-Seeking | Rent seeking | Theorie | Theory |
| Extent: | 28 S graph. Darst |
|---|---|
| Series: | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers / Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn. - Bonn : Univ., ZDB-ID 2029303-3. - Vol. 2000,5 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | Internetausg.: ftp://ftp.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/papers/bgse/2000/bgse5_2000.pdf |
| Classification: | D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; H57 - Procurement ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; Finanzwissenschaft |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001510204