SELF-ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS IN AN N-PLAYER DYNAMIC GAME
Year of publication: |
1988
|
---|---|
Authors: | FERSHTMAN, C. |
Institutions: | Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas School of Economics |
Subject: | economic theory | games |
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