Self-enforcing Wage Contracts.
The authors examine long-term wage contracts between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker when both can costlessly renege and bu y or sell labor at a random spot market wage. A self-enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege. In th e optimum self-enforcing contract, wages are sticky: they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated. They are updated by a simple rule: around each spot wage is a time invariant interval, and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into current interval. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Thomas, Jonathan ; Worrall, Tim |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0034-6527. - Vol. 55.1988, 4, p. 541-54
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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