Self-expropriation versus self-interest in dual-class voting : the Pirelli case study
Year of publication: |
2011
|
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Authors: | Bigelli, Marco ; Mengoli, Stefano |
Published in: |
Financial management. - Malden, Mass. [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0046-3892, ZDB-ID 186034-3. - Vol. 40.2011, 3, p. 677-699
|
Subject: | Pirelli <Mailand> | Hauptversammlung | Annual general meeting | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Aktienstimmrecht | Shareholder voting rights | Dividende | Dividend | 2007 |
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