Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations
Year of publication: |
1994-09-01
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Authors: | FORGES, Françoise ; MINELLI, Enrico |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | communication equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | rational expectations equilibrium |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 1994044 |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Source: |
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