Self-Interest through Delegation: An Additional Rationale for the Principal-Agent Relationship
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Hamman, John R ; Loewenstein, George ; Weber, Roberto A |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn : American Economic Assoc, ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590x. - Vol. 100.2010, 4, p. 1826-1847
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