Self-reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Feess, Eberhard ; Walzl, Markus |
Published in: |
Economica. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 0013-0427, ZDB-ID 18004. - Vol. 71.2004, 283, p. 333-348
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Saved in:
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