Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement when violators have heterogeneous probabilities of apprehension
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Innes, Robert D. |
Published in: |
The journal of legal studies. - Chicago, Ill. : Univ. of Chicago Press, ISSN 0047-2530, ZDB-ID 183993-7. - Vol. 29.2000, 1,1, p. 287-300
|
Subject: | Recht | Law | Normbefolgung | Legal compliance | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Theorie | Theory |
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