Self-Reporting, Investigation, and Evidentiary Standards
Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Gerlach, Heiko |
Published in: |
Journal of Law and Economics. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 56.2013, 4, p. 1061-1061
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
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