Seller competition by mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Damianov, Damian S. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 51.2012, 1, p. 105-137
|
Subject: | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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