Selling to the Mean
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kos, Nenad ; Messner, Matthias |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | optimal mechanism design | robustness | incentive compatibility | individual rationality | ambiguity aversion |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 5443 |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 832048305 [GVK] hdl:10419/113779 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_5443 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
-
Kos, Nenad, (2015)
-
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
Tillio, Alfredo Di, (2014)
-
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
Di Tillio, Alfredo, (2014)
- More ...
-
Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments
Kos, Nenad, (2013)
-
Extremal incentive compatible transfers
Kos, Nenad, (2013)
-
The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
Tillio, Alfredo Di, (2014)
- More ...