Sequencing strategies in large, competitive, ascending price automobile auctions: An experimental examination
This paper reports on a large-scale field experiment testing strategies available to a seller participating in simultaneous competitive sequential ascending price automobile auctions. Every other week, the seller offered approximately 100 vehicles for sale in an auction environment in which several competing sellers offered on the order of 3000 vehicles. The experiment tested various sequences in which the seller could offer the vehicles, such as high values first or low values first. Surprisingly, and contrary to intuition drawn from the theory of single item and single seller auctions, the worst performing sequence from those tested is for the seller to order vehicles from highest to lowest values. The best sequence is to group the vehicles by type and offer the low valued vehicles first and then move to offer the higher valued vehicles.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Grether, David M. ; Plott, Charles R. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 71.2009, 2, p. 75-88
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Auctions Used automobile Orders Multiple goods |
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