Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Calzolari, Giacomo ; Pavan, Alessandro |
Publisher: |
Evanston, IL : Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |
Subject: | Sequential common agency | mechanism design | contracts | endogenous types |
Series: | Discussion Paper ; 1457 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/221733 [Handle] RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1457 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance |
Source: |
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Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals
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