Sequential Decisions with Several Agents

We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Bassan, Bruno ; Scarsini, Marco
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Entscheidungstheorie \| Decision theory \| Erwartungsnutzen \| Expected utility \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 12, Iss. 2, August 19, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216078