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Sequential decisions with several agents

We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of information released to the agents. The explicit form of the optimal stopping time is given.
Year of publication:
1998-08-19
Authors: Scarsini, Marco ; Bassan, Bruno
Published in:
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 12.1998, 2, p. 371-391
Publisher: Springer
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Type of publication: Article
Notes:
Received: October 23, 1995; revised version: June 25, 1997
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597852
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