Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games
This paper shows the existence of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for cheap-talk extensions of signaling games for a class of signaling games called communication-impervious. An example shows there are well-behaved infinite signaling games with no sequential equilibria. The assumption that talk is cheap seems reasonable in many economic contexts and yields a very straightforward solution to the existence problem in infinite signaling games. The cheap-talk assumption opens the possibility of extending the methods of this paper to prove the existence of equilibrium in more-general extensive-form games with infinite action and information sets.
Year of publication: |
1990-12
|
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Authors: | Iorio, Karl ; Manuelli, Alejandro M. |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
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