Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games. Part 1: Sequential Equilibria
An example shows that there are well-behaved infinte signaling games with no sequential equilibria. We explore the relationship between equilibrium outcomes of the infinite game and those of approximating games. Consider a sequence of signaling games approaching a limit game. A "(sub)sequence of equilibrium outcomes of the approximating games will converge to a limit distribution. That limit distribution will be an equilibrium outcome of the limit game if it can be realized by strategies of the limit game. As a result of this general convergence result, we prove the existance of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for strongly monotonic games. In a companion article we explore the role of cheap talk in solving the non-existence problem.
Year of publication: |
1993-03
|
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Authors: | Iorio, Kark ; Manelli, Alejandro M. |
Institutions: | Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management |
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