Sequential mergers and antitrust authority's decisions in Stackelberg markets
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cunha, Mariana Forbeck ; Vasconcelos, Helder |
Published in: |
Journal of industry, competition and trade. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 1566-1679, ZDB-ID 2067120-9. - Vol. 18.2018, 3, p. 373-394
|
Subject: | Mergers | Myopic versus forward-looking merger control | Stackelberg | Fusion | Merger | Fusionskontrolle | Merger control | Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Theorie | Theory | Duopol | Duopoly | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Übernahme | Takeover | Unternehmenskonzentration | Market concentration |
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