Sequential torts and bilateral harm
This paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Friehe, Tim |
Published in: |
International Review of Law and Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188. - Vol. 29.2009, 2, p. 161-168
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Care incentives Sequential care Bilateral harm Tort law |
Saved in:
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