Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets of alternatives, in terms of properties defined on preferences over alternatives. We state our results under certain preference extension axioms which, at any preference profile over alternatives, give the list of admissible preference profiles over sets of alternatives. It turns out to be that requiring from a set to be a Condorcet winner at every admissible preference profile is too demanding, even when the set of admissible preference profiles is fairly narrow. However, weakening this requirement to being a Condorcet winner at some admissible preference profile opens the door to more permissive results and we characterize these sets by using various versions of an undomination condition. Although our main results are given for a world where any two sets – whether they are of the same cardinality or not – can be compared, the case for sets of equal cardinality is also considered. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003
Year of publication: |
2003
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kaymak, Barış ; Sanver, M. Remzi |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2003, 3, p. 477-494
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Sets of alternatives as condorcet winners
Kaymak, Barış, (2003)
-
Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Sanver, M. Remzi, (2005)
-
Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Sanver, M. Remzi, (2005)
- More ...