Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution
It is often argued that, even if optimal "ex post", settlement dilutes deterrence "ex ante". We analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing, "ex ante", to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is "ex ante" optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2004.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David |
Published in: |
Economica. - London School of Economics (LSE). - Vol. 71.2004, 283, p. 349-368
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Publisher: |
London School of Economics (LSE) |
Saved in:
freely available
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