Severance Payments in Equilibrium Unemployment

Under the insider wage model of Mortensen and Pissarides [Mortensen, D.T., Pissarides, C.A., 1994. Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397-415], this paper shows that (1) severance pay negatively affects market tightness (vacancy to unemployment ratio) and (2) the amount of severance pay is limited thereby insuring the employer a rational bargaining outcome

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Year of publication:	[2009]
Authors:	Usui, Emiko
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit \| Unemployment theory \| Abfindung \| Redundancy pay \| Insider-Outsider-Theorie \| Insider-outsider theory
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 94, No. 3, 2007 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 19, 2008 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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