Sex Selective Abortion and the Nature of Rights

Sex selective abortions pose an acute puzzle for those who endorse a womanﾒs right to choose. This essay examines the relationship between a prohibition on sex selective abortions and a right to choose. By way of the case of sex selective abortions, I make explicit a crucial hitherto unnoticed feature of the nature of rights. I argue that once we demarcate an area or interest off limits to state regulation, the reason, intent, or motivation of acting within it is irrelevant. This is, in part, the nature and appeal of rights. The law may limit how, when, and in what manner we may exercise a right but it may not dictate why we may exercise it. This presents the unique problem for prohibiting sex selective abortions precisely because such a prohibition looks to why a woman procures an abortion. The best solution to addressing the problem of such abortions may be to prevent woman from learning the sex of the fetus