Shareholder protection and agency costs : an experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
July 2018
|
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Authors: | LaRiviere, Jacob ; McMahon, Matthew ; Neilson, William |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 64.2018, 7, p. 3108-3128
|
Subject: | dividends | expropriations | agency costs | experiment | trust game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Experiment | Dividende | Dividend | Anlegerschutz | Investor protection | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance |
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