Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

María Gómez-Rúa

n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Gómez-Rúa, María
Published in:	SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1869-4195, ZDB-ID 2536381-5. - Vol. 4.2013, 2, p. 137-153
Subject:	cost sharing \| pollutant-cleaning cost \| water taxes \| Gewässerbelastung \| Water pollution \| Ökosteuer \| Environmental tax \| Soziale Kosten \| Social costs \| Verteilungswirkung \| Distributional effect \| Shapley-Wert \| Shapley value \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzung Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2 [DOI] hdl:10419/77748 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756937