Sharing a river among satiable agents
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Ambec, Stefan ; Ehlers, Lars H. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 64.2008, 1, p. 35-50
|
Subject: | Wasserpolitik | Water policy | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Core | Theorie | Theory |
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