Sharing the Information or Not? Strategic Analysis in the Online Channel Supply Chain with Entry

This paper discusses a case that a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (M) and an e-tailer (Y) at the initial stage. There is a new e-tailer (Y) who enters the market with some probability. Both e-tailers have two selling modes to choose from, i.e., the agency selling mode and the reselling mode. It is assumed that contractual information between the incumbents (X and M), including selling mode and pricing decisions, can be shared with the entrants.Based on this, the paper first explores firms' preferences for information-sharing strategies, and then discusses the impact of the probability and intensity of competition on firm performance. It finds that in any channel structure, whether the information is shared or not, the manufacturer prefers selling products from only one online channel when the competition is not that fierce. As the competition increases, the manufacturer is more willing to add another online channel. In addition, it is noticed that the manufacturer prefers to share the information with the e-tailer Y under the AA structure and not to share the information under the RA structure. On the contrary, e-tailers X and Y prefer information sharing under the RA structure and not sharing under the AA structure