Shifted deductibles for high risks : more effective in reducing moral hazard than traditional deductibles
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Kleef, R. C. van ; Ven, Wynand P. van de ; Vliet, Reinier C. van |
Published in: |
Journal of health economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-6296, ZDB-ID 625797-5. - Vol. 28.2009, 1, p. 198-209
|
Subject: | Krankenversicherung | Health insurance | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory |
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