Shirking versus managerial incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) : a note on a possible misunderstanding of principal-agent theory
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Güth, Werner |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 151.1995, 4, p. 693-698
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Arbeitsproduktivität | Labour productivity | Motivation | Theorie | Theory |
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