Should Auctions be Transparent?
Year of publication: |
2010-08
|
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Horner, Johannes |
Institutions: | Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University |
Subject: | First price auction | Repeated auction | Private bids | Information revelation |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The price is None Number 1764 70 pages |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
-
Should Auctions be Transparent?
Bergemann, Dirk, (2010)
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Should Auctions Be Transparent?
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Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction
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Should Auctions be Transparent?
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