Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? : a game-theoretic analysis
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Meccheri, Nicola ; Fanti, Luciano |
Published in: |
Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1099-1468, ZDB-ID 1491342-2. - Vol. 39.2018, 1, p. 3-14
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Subject: | Anreizregulierung | Incentive regulation | Management | Vertrag | Contract | Gewerkschaft | Trade union | Arbeitsbedingungen | Working conditions | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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