Should Rational Economic Agents Attempt to Exert 'Control' Over the Evolution of Their Risk Preferences?

Let α denote risk preference parameters, such that α→0 (respectively, α→Z>0) implies tatonnement towards risk seeking preferences (respectively, risk aversion). Suppose either of two agents, i and j enter into a market with risk preference parameters, α₀(i)=0.1 or α₀(j)=Z-0.1. With T as investment horizon, rationality of each of agents i or j is evident in the disposition, conditional on states of the world to emerge, to tatonnement, respectively to α_{T}(i)=Z-0.1 or α_{T}(j)=0.1. If agents i and j adopt targets of, α_{T}(i)=α<α=α_{T}(j), disposition to bidirectional tatonnement between α=0.1 and α=Z-0.1 remains a necessary condition for achievement of either objective. In light of study findings, the designation of risk preferences as free parameters of decision making is a necessary condition for inference of fully rational implementations of choice under uncertainty. Necessarily, there is arrival at demand for decision making rubrics that, simultaneously are robust to conditions which support demonstrations of either of risk aversion or risk seeking preferences, but yet which facilitate a choice between assets that support either of the two sets of preferences. Importantly and seemingly counterfactually, with full rationality of actions premised on existing awareness' of economic agents, full rationality is nested in the functioning of economic agents as boundedly rational agents. There is arrival, as such at the much sought out result that has eluded neoclassical models, namely the feasibility, to wit, actions, which are heterogeneous and perhaps dichotomous, that are undertaken by two agents have, simultaneously characterization as fully rational actions