Sicherung privater Investitionen – ein geeignetes Instrument der Entwicklungshilfe?

Abstract Peter Egger’s paper provides a synthesis of findings with regard to the impact of bilateral as well as multilateral means of protection of cross-border direct investments in less developed countries and, in turn, on their economic growth. In particular, he focuses on the role of bilateral investment treaties and multilateral agreements such as the GATS in this regard. Previous empirical work identifies a significant positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI. It suggests a similar impact of the GATS on FDI. He argues that these agreements contribute significantly to economic growth in less developed economies and countries in transition by spurring technology transfers through multinational activity of the developed countries in other economies Andreas Freytag and Sebastian Voll emphasize the important role of adequate institutions both for investment and development. The question is, whether investment guarantees as insurance for political risks in the recipient country support economic development or not. Actually, the German Federal Republic is the leading warrantor for FDI-insurances on the world, but the benefiting countries are not the LDC’s. Using these warranties as an instrument of development policy in the future is content of actual political discussion. They argue that, in case of economies with weak domestic institutions, investment guarantees could provide disincentives for politicians in the target country to establish rule of law and good governance. On the other hand, investment guarantees could foster development by providing additional access to FDI, especially in emerging market economies with sufficient and improving institutional quality Philipp Harms points out while foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing countries and emerging markets have increased substantially in recent years, many low-income countries are still shunned by multinational firms. One of the key causes for this observation is the poor quality of institutions and an often precarious political environment in these countries. Given the benefits of FDI for host country productivity and income levels, it could thus be argued that protecting the security of property rights is an effective way of enhancing growth and prosperity in poor countries. While he agrees with this point of view, he argues that “traditional” forms of development aid can substantially contribute to an improved investment climate in developing countries. This argument is based on the notion that insecure property rights reflect distributional conflicts in the host country population, and that appropriate development support can shift agents’ distributional interests in favor of foreign firms.