Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Lavi, Ron ; Oren, Sigal |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 76.2012, 2, p. 439-456
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Simultaneous ascending auctions | Myopic bidding | Signaling | Ex-post efficiency |
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