Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Ding, Wei ; Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Extensives Spiel \| Preiswettbewerb \| Signalling \| Dynamisches Gleichgewicht \| Theorie \| Auctions \| Signaling \| Price Competition

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 261
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13291 [DOI] 602497876 [GVK] hdl:10419/94064 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:261 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

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