Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period
To reduce information asymmetries for potential investors considering investment in an IPO venture, owners can signal the firm's longer-term viability and quality in several ways. The lockup period, is one signal that can be offered. We investigated the lockup period of a sample of 640 ventures going through the IPO and find that a longer lockup period acts as a substitute signal to venture capital (VC) and prestigious underwriter backing. Furthermore, we find that ventures which have a going concern issue can reduce the amount of underpricing at the time of the IPO by accepting a longer lockup period.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Arthurs, Jonathan D. ; Busenitz, Lowell W. ; Hoskisson, Robert E. ; Johnson, Richard A. |
Published in: |
Journal of Business Venturing. - Elsevier, ISSN 0883-9026. - Vol. 24.2009, 4, p. 360-372
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Lockup period Signaling IPO Underpricing |
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