Signaling and Reputation in Repeated Games, II : Stackelberg Limit Properties
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Roddie, Charles |
Publisher: |
[2012]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Signalling | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Reputation | Duopol | Duopoly |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (33 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 27, 2012 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2011835 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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