Signaling in First-Price Auctions
Year of publication: |
2010
|
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Authors: | Rieck, Thomas |
Publisher: |
Bonn : University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE) |
Subject: | Auktion | Asymmetrische Information | Signalling | Auktionstheorie | Asymmetric auction | first-price auction | signaling |
Series: | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; 18/2010 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 660928264 [GVK] hdl:10419/71900 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:bonedp:182010 [RePEc] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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